事实:一种基于柏拉图主义立场的解释

Fact:An Interpretation Based on Platonism

在哲学中,"事实"概念的重要性彰显在真理论与形而上学中。对于事实,流行解释认为它是以个体、共相作为组成部分的结构性实体,其中个体指的是日常意义上的对象,即伴随着其所有性质的个体。这样的解释将事实理解为时空领域中的存在物,它至少面临着三方面的困难:个体与事实的部分整体关系带来的困难,个体的时间依赖性带来的困难,以及事实统一体问题。从消解这些困难出发,本文试图论证,事实是一种柏拉图式的、抽象的结构性实体,作为其组成部分的个体不是日常意义的对象,而是抽离其所有性质的薄的个体。这样理解的事实并非是时空领域中的存在物。

Facts play a prominent role in metaphysical theories and truth theories, especially in correspondence theories of truth and truth-maker theories. According to the orthodox interpretation, a fact is a complex entity composed of particular（s） and attribute（s） among which a particular is an object in common sense, i. e. , a particular takes along with all and only its non- relational attributes. A fact under such interpretation is something which exists in the space-time realm and confronts three difficulties： the difficulty stems from the part-whole relation between particulars and facts, the difficulty results from the time-dependence of particulars, and the problem of the unity. Starting from the response to these difficulties, this paper demonstrates that a particular, as a constituent of a fact, is not an object in common sense, but a thin particular in abstraction from all its attributes. Since attributes are abstract entities, facts which consist of particulars and attributes are also abstract complex entities of some Platonism.