基于自由平等主义的立场反驳自由至上主义——发展内格尔对诺齐克的批判

Refute Libertarianism Based on Liberal Egalitarianism:Development of Nagel's Critiques to Nozick

内格尔分别从个人权利的不可侵犯性、个人权利的道德基础与诺齐克对平等主义分配正义的批评三个方面反驳了诺齐克的自由至上主义,尽管内格尔抓住了诺齐克许多论证不严密或理解有偏差的弱点,但是内格尔自己的论证也并非无懈可击。内格尔虽然指出了诺齐克没有区分不同的权利对个人的重要性不同,但是没有分析人际的权利比较是否正当;在讨论个人权利的道德基础时,他没有发现诺齐克的"生活意义"论证反而可以用来支持自由至上主义所反对的积极权利;他更没有察觉诺齐克与罗尔斯在"天资与任意性"问题上的对立源于他们对"自我-所有权"的不同理解。笔者将从自由平等主义的立场上,进一步完善和发展内格尔对自由至上主义的批判。

Nagel criticized Nozick＇ s libertarianism respectively from the inviolability of individual rights, the moral foundations of individual rights, and Nozick＇s critiques on distributive justice of liberal egalitarianism. Although Nagel captured some shortcomings of Nozick＇s views, such as the imprecision of his arguments and a few misunderstandings, Nagel＇s arguments were not invulnerable. Nagel pointed out that Nozick did not distinguish the fact that the gravity of different rights to individual was different, nor did he analyze whether it was legitimate to balance the importance of rights among individuals. While Nagel discussed the moral bases of individual rights, he did not find the fact that Nozick＇s ＂life meaning＂ argument could be used to support positive rights opposed by libertarianism. Nagel did not detect the fact that the opposition between Nozick and Rawls on the topic of ＂natural assets and arbitrariness＂ was derived from their contrary understandings of self-ownership. This paper attempted to amend and develop Nagel＇s criticism of libertarianism based on liberal egalitarianism.