内部控制与现金股利政策

Internal Control and Cash Dividend Policy

20世纪60年代至今,世界范围内频发"股利消失"现象。内部控制为这一特殊的股利现象提供了一个新的研究视角。以我国2007—2013年A股上市公司为样本,考察内部控制对现金股利分配力度的影响,其结果表明:内部控制质量越高,分配力度越弱,表明风险管控占主导作用,支持"替代模型"。进一步分析表明,内部控制质量越高,其与所在行业分配力度的差距越小,表明现金股利处于合理区间内,驳斥了过度规避风险的观点;检验分配倾向发现,内部控制质量越高,企业越倾向于发放现金股利;检验内部控制五要素发现,除内部监督之外的四要素与分配力度显著负相关。

Internal control has been an intense concern of officers, practitioners and scholars. Using a selection of Chinese A-share listed companies, we explore how internal control affects dividend policy. The results show that internal control has a negative relationship with the magnitude of cash dividend, indicating that risk management and control play a leading role. To ascertain whether risk management and control is excessive or not, we take industry magnitude as the standard, finding that the higher quality of internal control, the smaller gap with the industry standard. This means that in- ternal control puts cash dividend in a reasonable range, thus refuting the argument of excessiveness. Referring to the incli- nation of cash dividend, we find that it is positive. Finally, using five elements of internal control as independent variables, we discover that there are some differences among these elements. This paper enriches the research of internal control and dividend policy and provides a fresh perspective for policymakers.