摘要
物流园区自兴起以来,政府与企业之间的相互关系总是影响着园区的长远发展。文中通过研究政府与企业双方建设物流园区的博弈机理,识别双方的策略集,在不考虑外界经济环境因素条件下,构建了完全信息的静态博弈模型,认为政府应落实物流园区的监督控制,提高优惠条件,加强惩罚力度,从而减少企业投机行为。
Since the rise of logistics park ,th e relationship between the government and the enterprise has always affectedthe long - term development of the park. In this pap er, through the study of the government and the enterprise both in theconstruction of logistics park game mechanism to identify the strategy of both s e t, without considering the external economicenvironment factors, this paper constructs the complete information static game model that government should implement thecontrol of the supervision of the logistics p ark , provided high preferential conditions, strengthen the punishment, thus reducing theenterprises speculation.
出处
《物流工程与管理》
2016年第9期11-12,17,共3页
Logistics Engineering and Management
基金
湖北省教育厅课题"湖北物流园区分类发展对策研究"
项目编号B2013039
关键词
物流园区
政府监管
博弈模型
logistics park
government supervision
game model