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从符号资本视角看企业人事招聘中的名校偏好

Preferences of Famous School in Enterprise Personnel Recruitment under Symbolic Capital
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摘要 我国企业尤其是一些知名企业在人事招聘过程中体现出明显的名校偏好,这合乎一定的经济学逻辑。从符号资本的视角观察企业的名校情结,它主要考察这一现象的成因与不合理之处。名校毕业生因其自身充足的符号资本而受到企业的青睐,正是这种具有广泛社会基础的符号资本有助于企业辨认求职者的价值并具有增进企业利益的生产性。符号资本也产生了符号暴力,导致了就业市场中身份的固化、分化以及不公平现象。 Enterprises, especially those famous, often show their preferences of famous schools in the course of personnel recruitment. This fact may meet certain economy logic. Observing this phenomenon from a view of symbolic capital, we mainly analyze the reasons and unreasonable aspects of this phenomenon. From a sociological perspective, graduates of famous school can get favor from enterprises because of their enough symbolic capital. Symbolic capital which has broad social base can help enterprises to identify job seekers' values and have productivity which can enhance business interest. And it is symbolic capital that has produced symbolic violence and lead to differentiation of identity and unfair things in employment market.
作者 张恂 周祥 Zhang Xun Zhou Xian(School of Law and politics, Zhejiang Sci- Tech University, 310018, Hangzhou, Zhejiang, China School of Management,Nanjing University of Posts and Tel 210003, Nanjing , Jiangsu , China)
出处 《特区经济》 2016年第9期152-155,共4页 Special Zone Economy
关键词 符号资本 企业 人事招聘 名校偏好 symbolic capital enterprise personnel recruitment preferences of famous school
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参考文献14

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