物质构成与同一性

Material Constitution and Identity

如果物体A构成物体B,那么A与B是同一的吗?关于这一问题的"标准解释"(构成论)认为:"构成并非同一性"(即A≠B)。但构成论者对这一观点的核心论证中隐含着一个内在矛盾,即对莱布尼茨律的既肯定又否定的双重立场;并且构成论者无法合理地说明两个物体在同一时间占据同一个空间是如何可能的,因此构成论不可能成立。一个物体与构成它的物体是同一的,或者说"构成就是同一性"。

If an object A constitutes an object B, then is A identical with B？ The ＂standard account＂ （or ＂the constitution view＂） for this question is： constitution is not identity （A ~ B）. However, in this paper, I shall argue that the central argument of this view contains a contradiction, that is, the con- stitution theorists＇ double standards towards Leibniz Law; and this inner contradiction would lead to the collapse of their whole argument. Moreover, I maintain that constitution theorists cannot explain adequately how it is possible that two objects occupy the same place at the same time. Therefore, I con- clude that the constitution view is not tenable; an object is identical with the object which constitutes it. To put it another way, constitution is identity.