嵌入分部相关性的内部资本市场机制设计

Mechanism Design for Internal Capital Market based on the Embedded Relatedness of Divisions

分部相关性改变了总部-分部的信息结构,是分析内部资本市场(ICM)配置机制的重要视角。在机制设计理论框架下,加入了分部相关性来研究ICM投资决策流程。最优配置机制和数值模拟表明:1当分部相关性低时,总部对分部项目质量报告信号实施完全"挑选胜者"战略;当分部相关性高时,总部对分部项目质量报告信号实施不完全"挑选胜者"战略,随着分部相关性的变化,总部收益存在一个最低点;2当分部经理报酬比例极高时,总部对分部项目质量信号不做任何区分,分部间投资额是一致的;3一般情况下,项目风险越大,分部经理获取的信息租金就越多。

The divisions＇ relatedness is an important component when analyzing the mechanism of ICM,which changes the information structures between the headquarter and the divisions.Using the theory of mechanism design,the paper analyzes the significance of divisions＇ relatedness in the internal capital market.The result shows：（1）when the divisions＇ relatedness is low,the headquarter implements absolutely＂winner picking＂,and when the divisions＇ relatedness is high,the headquarter implements partial＂winner picking＂;（2）In special situation that the ratio of total income is too high,the headquarter does not implement＂winner picking＂;（3）If the risk degree of divisional project goes up,the division manager＇s information rents paid by the headquarter rises.We test the above-mentioned result using numerical simulation and empirical analysis,and the mechanism design results are partially supported by empirical data.