基于博弈论的地铁车站恐怖袭击风险定量分析方法

Quantitative Analysis of Terrorist Attack Risk at Subway Station based on Game Theory

地铁车站遭遇恐怖袭击可看作博弈双方即袭击者和防御者之间的零和博弈。在经典风险理论的基础上,根据零和博弈的最大值最小值理论确定了各地铁站防御资源分配的约束条件;利用Matlab求解了其纳什均衡解,得出各地铁站合理的防御资源分配,并从目标损失概率和损失程度两方面计算地铁遭遇恐怖袭击的风险值。假设恐怖分子以1kg TNT(三硝基甲苯)袭击地铁站,计算了防御资源的最佳分配和各地铁站的损失程度。通过实例应用,证明该计算方法具有可行性。

Terrorist attacks at subway station can be regar- ded as a zero-sum game between attackers （the terrorists） and defenders （subway station managers）. On the basis of classical risk theory, the limiting conditions of defense re- source allocation for each subway station based on the max- imum/minimum value theory and the zero-sum game theory are determined. Then, Matlab is used to draw the figures of Nash equilibrium, obtain the rational resource allocation and calculate the risks of terrorist attack at subway station from the aspects of the targets＂ probable losses and the de- grees of the losses. By assumpting the terrorist attack of subway station with 1 kg TNT, the optimal allocation of defense resources and the degree of losses at each station are calculated. The feasibility of this quantitative calculation is verified by a real subway station.