知识论析取主义,蕴涵论题与根据难题

Epistemological Disjunctivism, the Entailment Thesis and the Basis Problem

蕴涵论题认为,一个人"看到P"蕴涵他"知道P"。这个论题在知识论里面受到广泛讨论。从知识论的析取主义来看,如果我们支持蕴涵论题,并且以"看到P"作为"知道P"的理由,那么我们就会陷入根据难题,因此我们需要拒斥蕴涵论题。反对该论题的主要论证策略是来自信念的论证,即一个人可以看到P而不相信P,因此不能算是知道P。在此基础上,知识论的析取主义者可以进一步区分"看到P"和"知道P"这两个认知状态之间的差异。这场争论的核心问题是,来自信念的论证是否反对了蕴涵论题。针对信念论证的批评,文中首先指出来自信念的论证是有效的,并且重新刻画了信念论证的结构。此外,本文将进一步考察"看到P"与"知道P"的关系。

According to the Entailment Thesis, one sees that P entails one knows that P. This thesis is widely discussed in epistemology. Epistemological disjunctivism holds that seeing that P is the basis for knowing that P. This claim, together with the entailment thesis, will bring about the Basis Problem. In order to resolve the Basis Problem, epistemological disjunctivist tends to reject the entailment thesis. The primary strategy for rejecting this thesis is adopting the argument from belief. While Chris Ranalli labels the argument as useless, I will defend this argument and reformulate its structure. Moreover, I will revisit the relationship between seeing that P and knowing that P.