直觉作为证据的合理性与限度

Rationality and Limits of Intuition as Evidence

当代分析哲学普遍使用的概念分析、思想实验和反思平衡等论证方法最终都诉诸直觉作为证据。近年来,蓬勃兴起的实验哲学追问并反思直觉的合理性及其限度。在直觉问题上,证据论和取消论是当前最为流行的两种立场。两者虽不乏洞见,但都因过于保守或太过激进而有失偏颇。笔者认为,一种值得提倡的观点是直觉的限定论。这种立场既能捍卫直觉作为证据的合理性,又能提供直觉合法使用的边界。

The methods of contemporary analytic philosophy ultimately appeal to intuition as evidence, such as conceptual analysis, thought experiment and reflective equilibrium. In recent years, the rise of the experimental philosophy has been asking and rethinking rationality and its limits of intuitions. On the issue of intuition, evidentialism and eliminativism are two of the most popular standpoints. Both of them are no lack of insight, but they are too conservative or too aggressive on account of respective extreme positions. In my opinion, restrictionism of intuition will be a promoted standpoint. It not only defends rationality of intuition as evidence, but also provides limits of legitimate use of intuition.