自我欺骗问题研究——意向论vs.非意向论

On Self-Deception:Intentionalism vs.Non-Intentionalism

关于自我欺骗的道德心理学理论主要分为意向论和非意向论两大阵营。以戴维森为首的意向论阵营强调自欺是一种意向行为,按照一种人际间欺骗模型来认识自欺。意向论者认为人的心灵可以分为不同的人格系统,试图用一种非理性的心理因果性来解释自欺。以梅勒为首的非意向论者反对人际间欺骗模型,从而也反对把自欺看作一种意向行为,梅勒试图将自欺与认知心理学对接,认为自欺是由人类的认知特点造成的,而不是人自主造成的。梅勒提出偏差信念论之后,英美学界对自欺的讨论进入了一个新的阶段,但是这些新的观点又各有各的问题。我们将看到,引入不同的自我知识的理论能够帮助完善以上各个理论,为解决它们的问题提供帮助。

There are two ways to define self-deception, which are intentionalists＇ approach and non- intentionalists＇ approach. As an intentioanalist, Davidson emphasizes self-deception is intentional, and describes it as an interpersonal-deception. Intentioanalists claim that human mind can be divided into different self-nets, and we should use irrational mental causation to explain self-deception. Non-intentionalists argue against the model of interpersonal deception, and also argue against that self-deception is intentional. Mele treats self-deception as a phenomenon of human cognition, and regards it as a kind of non-autonomy. After Mele, the debates of self- deception have reached a new level. But the new opinions seem to have issues of themselves. And if we introduce some theories of self-knowledge, it may be helpful for both the intentionalists and Non-intentionalists to handle their problem.