保兑仓融资模式下价格补贴契约的协调研究

Research on Coordination Through Markdown Money Contract Based on Confirming Storage Finance

文章选择两阶段资金约束供应链——单一制造商和单一零售商为研究对象,考虑了供应链中零售商自有资金不足的情况,构建了保兑仓模式下价格补贴契约模型,应用Stackelberg博弈模型分别求解出分散决策下制造商的最优批发价格和零售商的最优订货量以及集中决策下整个供应链的订购量和利润,并且研究了保兑仓模式下价格补贴契约能否协调供应链这一问题。研究发现:在保兑仓供应链融资中引入价格补贴契约,可以提高各参与主体的收益,进而提高供应链的绩效,实现供应链的协调。该研究丰富了这一领域的研究内容,研究的结论可以为企业所用。

In this paper, we considered that a two-level supply chain of a manufacture and a financially constrained retailer. This paper analyzed the markdown money model under confirming storage finance. In decentralized decision-making context,manufacturer＇s optimal wholesale price and retailers＇ optimal order quantity are determined by using Stackelberg game model. As the buyback logistics cost increases, we combined markdown money policy with confirming storage finance, which improved the revenue of each participant and the performance of the supply chain. This study enriched the research content of this field and the conclusion of research can be applied in enterprises.