拆迁钉子户的生产机制:不平等的示范和倒逼效应

The Mechanism of Creating “Nail Houses”——the Effect of Example Setting and Imitation

基于对中部某县拆迁纠纷的田野调查,本文发现钉子户和其他拆迁户之间的"补偿差异"正在成为主导征地拆迁走向的一个关键变量,这一差异产生了"不平等的示范和倒逼效应"。而夹在中央政府和拆迁户之间的基层政府因为缺少"拔钉子"的手段,而无力应对这一困局。结果拆迁户人人争当钉子户,以避免自身利益的"相对剥夺"。实践中,种种怀柔政策或者强拆之举,不是鼓励了钉子户的缠闹逻辑,便是加剧了征地拆迁中的矛盾冲突。这一现象促使我们重新思考转型时期的国家社会关系和基层治理方式,后者正是宏观制度设计在微观经验层面得以"贯彻"的社会基础。

Based on a case study conducted in a county in the middle China, this study clarifies a significant factor shaping the dynamics and outcomes of demolition which is the compensation difference between'nail houses' and other homeowners. Local authorities normally have no better ways to stop the effect of example setting and imitation. Consequently, more and more homeowners choose to become'nail houses', in order to maximize their interests. This phenomenon encourages us to reconsider the state-society interaction and the ways of governance in the period of transition. The latter is exactly the social foundation of how macro- level policy is well implemented in grassroots China.