我国养老基金投资的审慎投资人规则被引量：10

China's Prudent Investor Rule of the Investment of Pension Fund

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摘要我国养老基金采机构集合型投资,在受托机构及投资管理机构的审慎投资人规则及责任缺失的前提下,受益人及地方政府对养老基金投资风险的承担,为养老基金投资风险规制提供了逆向激励。养老基金的机构集合型投资与受益人自治型投资相比,受益人选择权弱化、投资机构控制权增强、投资过程透明度降低。审慎投资人规则由投资人行为规范到投资风险量化控制的演进,勾勒出养老基金投资风险规制由对受益人的代理投资人的规制,到对集合型投资机构投资行为审慎性的激励的演变。因而我国养老基金投资的法律规则,应重新厘定受托机构及投资管理机构的集合型金融服务机构的法律地位、重构其审慎投资人规则、完善投资风险治理结构及外部监管,为养老基金投资的风险规制及投资安全提供正向激励。 China＇s pension funds are publicly invested by the authorized wholesale institutions. Given the deficiency of prudent investor rules and liabilities in the trustee organization and investment management agency, the beneficiaries and local governments＇ behaviors of bearing the risk of investing pension funds provides adverse incentive for the mechanism of this ＂kind of risk. Compared with the beneficiaries＇ autonomy investment, the wholesale institution investment in pension funds will weaken the option of beneficiaries, strengthen the control of investment institutions and reduce the transparency of the investment. The process that prudent investor rule evolves from investors＇ code of conduct to quantitative control of the investment risk has outlined the evolution from regulation on the beneficiaries＇ representative agents to incentives for prudent investment of wholesale institutions. Therefore, China＇s law should determine the legal status of collective financial service organization of the trustee organizations and the investment agencies, reconstruct the rules of prudent investors and complete the risk governance and external supervision of these institutions, which will provide incentives for the risk regulation and investment security of pension fund investment.

作者张春丽

机构地区中国政法大学民商经济法学院

出处《中国法学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2016年第5期239-259,共21页 China Legal Science

关键词养老基金投资风险审慎投资人规则

分类号 D922.291 [政治法律—经济法学]

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