基于Stackelberg博弈的零售商自有品牌产品定位与促销投入研究

An Analysis on Product Position and Promotion Investments of Retailer's Store Brand Based on Stackelberg Game

实施自有品牌战略已成为零售商获取竞争优势的重要途径。文章考虑由单个制造商和单个零售商构成的分销渠道,采用Stackelberg博弈模型研究了零售商自有品牌产品的定位选择与促销投入问题。结果表明:自有品牌基础需求量是决定零售商开发自有品牌的重要前提,该结果与现实中大多数大中型零售企业均开发自有品牌,而鲜有小型零售企业开发自有品牌一致。在制造商盈利水平高于其保留利润时,自有品牌促销投入使零售商及分销渠道整体利润增加,但制造商利润减少;零售商自有品牌与制造商品牌替代性越小,差异越大,零售商与分销渠道整体利润提升越显著,制造商利润的下降水平越显著;促销效率越高,零售商与分销渠道整体利润提升越显著,制造商利润的下降水平越显著。

Store brand has become an important strategy for retailers to gain competitive advantages. This paper investigatesproduct position and promotion investments of retailer＇s store brand in a distribution channel composed of one manufacturerand one retailer. Results indicate that the basic demand of store brand is a deterministic factor for retailers to introduce storebrand. The results are consistent with most large-scale retailers developing their store brands, but not small ones. When pro-motion efficiency is smaller than the threshold value, promotion investments can improve the retailer＇s profit and the totalchannel profits, but lower the manufacturer＇s profit. The greater difference between the store brand and the national manufac-ture＇s brand is, the more retailer＇s profit and total channel profits increase, and the more manufacturer＇s profit reduces. More-over, the higher promotion efficiency is, the more retailer＇s profit and total channel profits increase, and the more manufactur-er＇s profit reduces.