摘要
文章从企业行为理论视角分析了绩效反馈对国有企业研发投入的影响,并探讨分析师覆盖与外部董事两类治理机制对这一影响的调节作用。基于2007-2014年中国206家A股上市国有企业数据,采用固定效应面板回归进行分析。实证结果表明:高于社会期望的绩效会减少国有企业的研发投入,低于行业期望的绩效会增加国有企业的研发投入;较高的分析师覆盖会弱化拥有高于社会期望的绩效对研发投入的负作用,但将加强低于社会期望的绩效对研发投入的提升作用;而外部董事比例增加,不能显著的改变高于行业期望的绩效对研发投入的影响,但将弱化低于行业期望的绩效对研发投入的提升作用。研究结论为新兴经济下国有企业的研发投入提供了基于行为理论的解释与相关建议。
The paper, from the behavioral theory of the firm, analyzes the direct effect of performance feedback on RD invest-ment and explores the moderating effect of analyst coverage and outside director on the relationship between performance feed-back and RD investment in the context of China＇s state-owned enterprises. According to the China＇s SOEs panel data from206 A-Share listed companies in manufacturing industry during 2007 to 2014, using the fixed effect panel regression to ana-lyze the relationship. The results show that RD investment will decrease when the performance of the company exceed the so-cial aspiration in SOEs, on the other hand, the performance below the social aspiration will lead to an augment in RD invest-ment. Higher analyst coverage weakens the negative effect of performance feedback which is higher than social aspiration onRD investment. But it strengthens the positive effect of performance feedback which is lower than social aspiration on RDinvestment. Higher ratio of outside directors has no significant effect on the relationship between performance and RD invest-ment when performance is higher than the social aspiration, but when performance is lower than the social aspiration, as theportion of outside directors grows, RD investment drops. Finally, the conclusion for RD investment in SOEs under the con-dition of the emerging economy provides some explanations and related suggestions which are based on corporate behavioraltheory.
出处
《华东经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第10期123-130,共8页
East China Economic Management
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71172185)
国家自然科学基金优秀青年基金项目(71222202)
关键词
研发投入
分析师覆盖
外部董事
绩效反馈
R＆D investment
analyst coverage
outside director
performance feedback
