不完全信息下危险品瞒报问题的进化博弈研究

Research on Evolutionary Game under Incomplete information of Dangerous Goods Concealed Problems

在不完全信息条件下,通过构建危险品瞒报进化博弈论模型来分析第三单位物流在承运过程中出现的危险品瞒报现象的利益博弈关系。得出在第三单位物流承运过程中,影响承运单位是否瞒报的因素主要是瞒报与不瞒报两者的费用支出之间的关系。在这种关系下,承运单位要权衡两者的支出费用,进而才能倾向于选择是否瞒报,另一个因素就是监察部门的调查力度,也是一个重要因素。就监察部门来说,要想遏制事故瞒报的发生,其主要是要降低调查事故的费用成本,并提高瞒报相应的罚款力度,才能使承运单位主动的上报事故,而不是倾向于隐瞒。

Under the condition of incomplete information, the interests of the game to analyze the relationship between the third phenomena concealed dangerous goods logistics in the carrier appeared in the process of dangerous goods con- cealed by constructing evolutionary game theory＇model.The third unit of logistics carrier process, factors affecting the carriage units are concealed is not concealed and concealed relationship between the expense of both.In this relationship, the carrier unit to balance the cost of spending, this can tend to choose whether or not to cheat;Another factor is the watchdog to study dynamics, is also an important factor.The supervisory department, to curb the occurrence of accidents hidden,The key is to reduce the accident investigation cost, and increase the intensity of the corresponding fines con- cealed,in order to make the carrier to report to the accident, rather than tend to conceal.