产业集群知识溢出的Stackelberg博弈研究

Research on Stackelberg Game of Industrial Cluster Knowledge Spillover

核心企业和配套企业在集群中的地位是不对等的,通过集群企业地位不对等下知识溢出的Stackelberg博弈分析研究,结果表明:从集群整体视角,并不是核心企业知识溢出越多集群收益越大,还取决于核心企业和配套企业对溢出知识的吸收能力。从核心企业视角,并不是政府奖励越大核心企业知识溢出越多,还取决于奖励的具体程度,只有足够的奖励才能促进核心企业增加知识溢出。从配套企业视角,配套企业并不是完全被动,也可以通过提高知识吸收能力实现自身收益最大化。

The status of the core enterprises and supporting enterprises in cluster are incoordinate,according to analysis on the Stackelberg game for knowledge spillover under incoordinate status of cluster enterprises,the research shows that： From the overall cluster view,more the knowledge spillover of core enterprises does not lead to greater cluster benefit,which also depends on the absorbency of core enterprises and supporting enterprises to knowledge spillover. Based on the core enterprise view,greater the government reward does not lead to more knowledge spillover of core enterprises,which also depends on the specific degree of reward. Only the enough reward could promote the core enterprise to add the knowledge spillover. Based on the supporting enterprises view,the supporting enterprises aren＇t completely passive,which could realize their income maximization by improving knowledge absorbency.