摘要
研究不同权力结构对独立再制造商技术创新策略的影响,建立并求解原制造商为领导(OL)、再制造商为领导(IRL)、无领导(NL)模式下的研发创新模型。研究表明:再制造商的均衡创新水平与创新成本负相关,与消费者对再制品认可度正相关;当创新效率较高时,IRL模式下的技术创新水平和再制品需求量最大,供应链各方具有"先动优势";当创新效率较低时,OL模式下的技术创新水平和再制品需求量最大,供应链各方具有"后动优势";在绝大多数情况下,供应链的模式偏好为OLIRLNL。
This study investigates how different power structure influences IR's technology innovation strategy under remanufacturing supply chain by game theory. Three R&D innovation models marked OL (OEM as Leader), IRL(IR as Leader) and NL(No Leader) are developed and solved and the results are ana- lyzed using mathematical analysis and numerical simulation methods. It is found that the balanced level of in- novation has negative relationship with the R^D cost and positive relationship with the valuation of consumer to remanufactured product. It is also found that IRL model can get the most level of technology innovation and demand of remanufacturing product and he supply chain members can enjoy a "first-move advantage" when the innovation efficiency is high, while the OL model can achieve the same effect and the members have "second-move advantage" when the innovation efficiency is lower. However, the model preference of the sup- ply chain is ranking as OL,〉IRL〉and NLin most of the time.
出处
《管理学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第10期1563-1570,共8页
Chinese Journal of Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71101120
71440016)
江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学基金资助项目(2016SJB630135)
四川省软科学研究计划基金资助项目(2015ZR0217)
四川省社会科学重点研究基地四川循环经济研究中心规划基金资助项目(XHJJ-1515)