具有社会责任意识的单生产商-两零售商供应链均衡决策研究

On Equilibrium Decisions of Socially Responsible Supply Chain with One Manufacture and Two Retailers

为了分析企业社会责任意识的影响,针对生产商和其中一个零售商同时具有社会责任意识的单生产商-两零售商供应链,基于动态博弈理论,求解生产商统一定价和差别定价两种模式下的供应链均衡决策。研究发现:1生产商或零售商的社会责任意识越强,消费者剩余越大。2生产商的最优批发价与其社会责任意识成反比,零售商的最优订货量与其社会责任意识成正比。从自身经济利益出发,生产商或零售商并不总是具有提高其社会责任意识的内在动力。3适度的企业社会责任意识能够改善供应链整体的经济利益,并在一定条件下使其达到集中决策下的最大值。采用数值算例验证了相关结论。

In order to analyze the influence of corporate＇ social responsibility consciousness （SRC）,equilibrium decisions under the manufacturer＇s two pricing modes, namely uniform pricing and discriminatory pricing, were solved based on the dynamic game theory in a one manufacture-two retailers supply chain （SC） where the manufacturer and one of the retailers are simultaneously socially concerned. It is found that. the consumer surplus increases with the SRC of any corporate; the manufacturer would lower the wholesale price and the retailer would order more if they are more so- cially concerned. Neither the self-interested manufacturer nor the self-interested retailer always has the internal impetus to increase his SRC;moderating SRC could improve the whole SC, and, under some specific conditions, could even lead it to the optimal performance as the centralized case. In the end, numerical examples were given to illustrate the theoretical conclusions.