随机惩罚下政府和非正规回收群体的演化博弈

Evolutionary Game of Government and Informal-recycling-group under Random Punishment

为了探索在随机惩罚的情况下,政府监督策略和电子废弃物非正规回收群体回收行为之间的影响,构建了政府和非正规回收群体间的演化博弈模型。首先从理论上分析了政府的随机惩罚和补贴对非正规回收群体回收行为策略的影响,然后利用数值仿真进一步验证随机惩罚、补贴、回收收入等外生变量和内生变量对回收行为策略的影响。结果表明:通过增大随机惩罚或补贴的方式来促进非正规回收群体选择转型升级,不仅需要在监管部门对非正规回收群体采取的随机惩罚小于社会效益和污染治理成本之和的前提下,而且还需要满足关于监督力度的特定条件;政府如果加大监督力度,适当增加政府补贴,合理控制随机惩罚,将有利于电子废弃物回收行业的可持续长期发展。

In order to explore the influence on the supervision strategy of the government and the recycling behavior of the informal-recycling-group of the electronic waste,the evolutionary game model related with the government and the informal-recycling-group is constructed. First,the effects of random punishment and subsidy on the recycling behavior of the informal-recycling-group are analyzed from the perspective of theory,and then the effects of the exogenous variables and endogenous variables on the recycling behavior strategies are verified with the numerical simulation,such as the random punishment,the subsidy,and the income of recycling. The results show that increasing the random punishment or subsidies to promote the informal-recyclinggroup to choose their transformation and upgrading not only demands the supervision department to take the random punishment to the informal-recycling-group,which should be less than the sum of social benefits and the cost of pollution control,but also to meet the specified conditions of the supervision dynamics. If the government increases its supervision dynamic,appropriately increases the government subsidies and reasonably controls its random punishment,it will be beneficial to the recycling industry of electronic waste in a long-term sustainable development.