基于博弈论的虚拟企业稳定性分析

Research on the Stability of Virtual Enterprise based on Game Theory

文章首先对虚拟企业研究的文献进行梳理,引发了对虚拟企业的战略联盟稳定性的思考,进而通过构建一个两阶段非重复博弈模型,分析虚拟企业的稳定性。从现有虚拟企业发展来看,虚拟企业选择的企业战略联盟往往是自发非强制性的。由此得出研究结论:合作虽然能够使企业双方仍持有企业本身经营管理的独立性和自主性,而合作的非强制性导致虚拟企业的战略联盟呈现不稳定性。这不利于虚拟企业长久发展和企业价值的提升。为保持虚拟企业的高度稳定性,研究提出相关政策建议:根据不同企业间的特点,建立正式制度的联盟机制或非强制性的声誉信任机制,切实保障虚拟企业的长期稳定合作关系,实现虚拟企业的未来经营发展和企业价值的提高等现实意义。

In this paper, we first review the literature on the research of virtual enterprise, and then we have some thoughts aboutthe stability of the strategic alliance of virtual enterprise. Based on the construction of a two stage with non-repeated game model, thestability of the virtual enterprise is analyzed. From the development of virtual enterprise, the selected strategic alliance is often spontaneousnon-mandatory. So, the conclusion is shown below. Mutual cooperation can enable enterprises still holding their independence andautonomy, while the non-mandatory would co-led virtual enterprise strategic alliance presents instabilities. This is not conducive tolong -term development to increase their value. So, the relevant policy suggestions are provided as following. In order to realize thevirtual enterprises＇ future business development and improve the corporate value significance, according to the different enterprisescharacteristics, the virtual enterprise should build up the alliance mechanism of formal institution or non-mandatory reputation trustmechanism, to guarantee the long-term stability of virtual enterprise cooperation.