不完全信息下军事威逼讨价还价博弈分析

Game Theoretical Analysis of Military Compellence Bargaining Process with Incomplete Information

在详细分析威慑与威逼区别的基础上,构建了不完全信息下军事威逼讨价还价博弈模型。按照最大期望效用准则,分析了不完全信息下军事威逼走向讨价还价阶段的条件,研究表明:运用鲁宾斯坦经典讨价还价唯一完美均衡解,得出以下结论:争夺目标自身的效用越大,战争带来的声誉得益效用越大,军事威逼走向讨价还价阶段的可能性越大;一旦进入讨价还价阶段,威逼者会接受挑战者提出的方案,冲突将不再发生。

The meanings of deterrence and compellence are distinguished. And then a military compellence bargaining model with incomplete information is advanced. According to the expected utility maximization criterion the condition of military compellence to bargaining game is yielded. With Rubinstein bargaining equilibrium the following conclusions are obtained. The larger the target avail which is contested is,the larger the report avail which is obtained by the war is,the larger the probability that the players go into bargaining process is. Once the players go into bargaining process the conflict will not occur any more and the defender will accept the project that the challenger advanced.