心身难题的概念羁绊

The Conceptual Obstacle in the Mind-Body Problem

我们遭遇心身关系问题的症结,源自作为基础的本体论层面的困境——从概念的种类看,用以把握心灵的主观层面的形式与用来了解大脑的客观层面的形式似乎是不可通约的,体现为:经验表述受到语言限制,心理事件无法纳入严格的规律,主体对于自己的心智状态拥有某种别人不可分享的通路。为了在心身难题上有所进展,本文试图摆脱这样的假设,即"心理"和"物理"具有相互排斥性,二者是互不相容的存在论范畴。"心"与"身"被看作互换而不共存的两种视角,身体中的事件以心灵中的观念来表现,并且具有表现性的对应关系,而实现这种对应的途径已经包含在实体之中——机体进行目的性活动的能力构成它们内在活动的源泉,通过生命范畴的联结,心与身保持了可共同实现的机制。

The crux of the problem of the relationship between mind and body stems from an underlying ontological dilemma.From the point of view of the concepts' categories,the form by which we grasp the subjective soul seems to be incommensurable with the form by which we understand the objective brain.This paper attempts to get rid of the assumption that the 'psychological'object and 'physical'object are mutually exclusive,and that they belong to incompatible ontological categories.'Mind' and 'body' should be regarded as two interchangeable yet non-coexisting perspectives,with the events of the body being performed through the concepts in the mind and possessing an expressive correspondence to them.Through the coupling of living categories,the mind and body maintain a jointly-realizable mechanism.