高管权力、股权结构与预算松弛

Executive Power,Ownership Structure and Budgetary Slack

预算松弛是企业预算管理与公司治理领域重要的结合点之一,不仅是企业财务控制的重要目标,也是企业高管职位壕沟效应的重要策略工具。基于面板数据模型,本文就我国上市公司高管权力对预算松弛的影响进行了实证研究,发现我国上市公司预算松弛受到高管权力的显著影响,高管权力越大的公司出现预算松弛的可能性越高;第一股东持股比例与预算松弛呈正相关性,不同终极产权性质对预算松弛影响显著;相对于非国有企业,国有企业出现预算松弛的可能性更大,并且高管权力对预算松弛程度的影响更明显。

Budgetary slack is an important point of enterprise budget management and corporate governance,which is not only an important means of financial control of enterprise,but also an important strategic tool of enterprise executive positions entrenchment effect. Based on the panel data model,the paper empirically studied the impact of executive power of listed corporation in China on budgetary slack. Research showed that China＇s listed corporation budgetary slack significantly affected the executive power： the larger executive power,the higher possibility of budgetary slack; the proportion of the first shareholders has a positively linear relationship with budgetary slack,and the different ultimate property rights influence budgetary slack significantly; compared with the non- state-owned enterprises,state-owned enterprises have greater possibility of budgetary slack,and the impact of executive power on budget slack is more obvious.