摘要
研究考虑了由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的动态博弈模型,制造商通过零售商和直销渠道销售商品的双渠道供应链。其中,制造商与零售商均通过广告投资影响商誉进而影响销量,制造商投资全国性广告对双渠道都起促进作用,零售商可以选择对双渠道都促进作用的广告也可以选择只对自身零售渠道起促进作用的广告。研究结果表明,零售商做的广告对制造商的直销渠道的影响是积极的,并且积极作用越大的时候制造商能得到更多的利润,而零售商的收益却与其广告的类型及作用大小无关。
It considers dynamics game model made of one manufacturer and retailer,and manufacturer sell commodity dual-channel supply chain by retailer and direct channel.Thereinto,manufacturer and retailer both influence business reputation and sales volume by advertisements,manufacturer invests national advertisement to further dual-channel,and retailer may select advertisement which has facilitation to dualchannel or only to its own retail channel.The study finds that retail＇s advertisement is positive to manufacture＇s direct channel,what＇s more,the bigger the positive affect,the more profit the manufacturer can get,however,retailer＇s income has nothing to do with type and effect size of its advertisement.
作者
李萌辉
周刚
Li Menghui Zhou Gang(Department of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072 ,Chin)
出处
《甘肃科学学报》
2016年第5期140-147,共8页
Journal of Gansu Sciences
关键词
动态博弈
双渠道供应链
广告投资
Dynamics game
Dual-channel supply chain
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