公众参与下的企业能源消费行为演化研究

Study on evolution of enterprise's energy consumption behavior under public participation

企业能源消费导致的环境污染严重影响公众的公共健康水平,阻碍生态文明的可持续发展.运用演化博弈理论与方法,围绕公共健康损失赔偿大小,研究了公众与高污染企业能源消费行为策略选择的互动机制;运用数值实验建立了公共健康损失赔偿较小、公共健康损失赔偿较大以及公共健康损失与企业额外收益均较大三种博弈场景,展示了决策参数的不同取值和初始状态改变对演化结果的影响.研究表明:在不同场景下,公众参与下的企业能源消费行为演化路径的速度与策略均有差异.公众与高污染企业的策略主要由公众健康损失赔偿、企业转型成本及额外收益共同决定;公共健康损失赔偿较大、污染企业实行能源转型策略比例达到95%以上与企业额外收益足够大时,公众与污染企业最终分别演化为不参与环境管理和实行能源转型策略.本文的研究结果可为公共健康水平的提升提供相应的参考.

Enterprise energy consumption leading to environment pollution has been a heavily impact on public health, and hinders sustainable development of ecological civilization. Based on evolutionary game theory, this paper studies interactive mechanisms between public participation in environment managemeat and high pollution industries around public health damage penalty. Three game scenarios, the lower health damage compensation, the higher compensation, the larger enough health damage compensation and high additional sales are established. It shows the influence of different of decision-making parameters and change of initial condition on evolution results by numerical experiments. The research results show that, the evolution of enterprise＇s energy consumption behavior has significant difference in different scenario. The three main factors, health damage compensation, energy transition costs and additional income contribute to enterprise＇s transformation strategy and the public participating in environmental management. The public and polluting enterprises converges to non-participation in environmental management, implementation of energy transformation with lager enough health damage compensation high implementation of energy transformation of over 95% in polluting enterprises groups and high additional sales. The conclusion has important instruction meaning and reference value for improving public health.