生态补偿的复制动态及其进化稳定策略研究——以黄河流域上游青藏高原区为分析背景

Replicator dynamics and evolutionary stable strategy on ecological compensation——The Tibetan Plateau Area of Upper Reaches of The Yellow River as Analysis Background

以黄河流域上游青藏高原区建立流域生态补偿的必要性为分析背景,将保护者(破坏者)和受益者(受害者)视作补偿客体和补偿主体利益群体,依托地方政府,引入第三方NGO组织作为"惩罚"和"支付"平台,构建了博弈双方收益矩阵。运用有限理性非对称博弈模型分析了补偿客体和补偿主体的复制动态和进化稳定策略,并借助雅可比矩阵及其迹对均衡点抗扰动的稳定性进行了分析。结果表明:在第三方NGO组织的"双向惩罚"约束机制下,补偿客体和补偿主体之间的非对称博弈系统在关系1下才存在唯一的具有抗扰动的稳定性的均衡点,即(保护,支付),而且补偿客体的长期和短期经济收益(L1和S1)及策略选择在该博弈系统中起着决定性的作用;不管博弈双方在该非对称博弈系统中的初始状态处于何种位置,通过第三方NGO组织的"双向惩罚"约束(或刺激)博弈双方的策略选择行为,均可增加博弈双方中的一方或双方向均衡点(保护,支付)调整的比重。

This research took the necessity of watershed ecological compensation for Tibetan Plateau of the upper reaches of Yellow River as a starting point, the protector （spoilers） and beneficiaries （victims） as the interest groups of compensation object and main body respectively to build a game both sides payoff matrix, on the basis of supported by local governments and introducing a third - party NGO as punishment and payment platform. The replicator dynamics and evolutionary stable strategy of the compensation object and main body were analyzed by asymmetric Game Model of Bounded Rationality. And the anti - disturbance stability of the equilibrium point was analyzed by Jacobian and Trace. The results show that under the ＂two -way punishment＂ restraint mechanisms of NGO, the stable equilibrium point with anti -disturbance, namely （protection, payment） ,was existed only in ＂1 relationship＂. The long- term and short- term economic gains and strategy selection of compensation object played a decisive role in this game system. It can increase one or both sides of the equilibrium point （ protection, payment） to adjust the proportion though ＂Bidirectional punish＂ of NGO.