不完全信息下公共租赁住房匹配机制--基于偏好表达策略的实验研究

The Public Rental Housing Mechanism with Incomplete Information: An Experimental Study Based on Preference Revelation Strategies

在价格机制不能充分发挥作用的社会资源分配中,G-S匹配机制被理论证明具有稳定配置资源的性能,IIRSD机制则是目前国内实际采用的公共租赁住房匹配机制。本文在实验室模拟我国公租房匹配情景,在不完全信息环境中运用随机摇号序列作为轮候人的优先权顺序,考察轮候人在G-S与IIRSD两种机制下的偏好表达策略,同时分析了匹配中的策略行为与个人理性及风险偏好的关系;计算并检验由此带来的个人效用与整体福利变化;构建无嫉妒公平分配指数来测度匹配结果的公平程度,从而直接比较两种机制在公平、效率与无策略性等方面的效果。实验结果表明,G-S机制不仅能促使被试真实表达自己的偏好,而且是比IIRSD机制更公平、更有效率的设计。

G- S mechanism was proved to be matched with a stable performance in resource allocation when the price mechanism cannot fully play its role in society to allocate resources. However, IIRSD mechanism was currently used to match with the public rental housing in China. In this paper, we simulated real matching with public rental housing in laboratory and used Yaohao random sequence to generate the order of individuals＇ priority as waiting with the incomplete information environment, in order to investigate individuals＇ strategy in expressing their preferences under the both G - S and IIRSD mechanisms. We also analyzed the relationship between the strategic behavior and individuals rational behavior or risk preferences; computed and tested personal utility and changes in overall welfare;buih a fair distribution of envy free index to measure the fairness of matching consequences, which directly compared the effect of both mechanisms in fair, efficient and non-strategic aspects. This study also has been tested the robustness of experimental results by changing the design, the number of group matches and simulating all the possible orders of priority. These experimental results show that G - S mechanism can promote not only the individuals to express their true preferences, and also is more fair and efficient design than IIRSD mechanism.