基于道德风险控制的互助担保价值评估模型

Mutual Guarantee Evaluation Model Based on Moral Hazard Control

针对现有担保价值的研究缺乏关注互助担保模式的特殊性问题,本文构建了考虑互助保证金的互助担保价值评估模型。通过模型的数值模拟分析发现,偿债能力和互助保证金不仅影响互助担保的价值,同时也会影响会员企业的道德风险动机。进而提出基于会员企业偿债能力监管和利益损失补偿的道德风险控制措施,并依据该措施对互助担保价值评估模型进行了拓展,同时通过数值模拟分析检验了控制措施的有效性。

Given that current literature does not consider special case of mutual guarantee, this paper firstly constructs the mutual guarantee evaluation model, taking mutual margin into consideration. We find, through simulation, that insolvency and mutual margin arc not only vital factors of mutual guarantee value but induce member firms＇ moral hazard motivation. Thus, we propose measures to control for the moral hazard based on monitoring member firms＇ insolvency ability and interest loss compensation, additionally, examines the effectiveness of those measures by extending original model and performing simulation analysis.