风险投资的公司治理作用:高管薪酬视角

A Governance Role of Venture Capital: Perspective from Executive Compensation in ChiNext Listed Firms

风险投资在公司治理中扮演了何种角色?文章从高管薪酬的角度,探讨风险投资对其所持股的创业板企业高管薪酬水平和结构,特别是对薪酬理论中的关键指标——薪酬绩效敏感度的影响作用。结果表明:与无风险投资持股相比,风险投资支持企业的高管总薪酬水平和股权薪酬显著更高;高管货币薪酬绩效敏感度较低,即风险投资对传统的管理层货币薪酬治理机制具有"替代效应",而风险投资支持企业的高管股权薪酬水平显著较高,风险投资发挥了对高管股权薪酬的"促进效应";控股股东两权分离度会显著影响风险投资替代效应、促进效应的发挥。文章揭示了风险投资对企业实施监督及增值的一种治理机制以及这种机制在不同股权结构下的变化,为研究我国风险投资的价值增值作用提供了实证支持。

This paper explores how VC affects the level and the structure of executive compensation, and its pay performance sensitivity. Using sample firms listed on ChiNext, our results show that： VC-backed firms have higher level of total executive com- pensation as well as stock-based compensation; The performance sensitivity of executive compensation of VC-backed firms is lower than that of non-VC-backed firms, implying a substitution effect of VC monitoring ; VC-backed firms have higher level of stock-based compensation （stock options and restricted stocks） compared with non-VC-backed firms, which implies an enhancement effect of VC on stock incentives ; Under the separation of controlling rights and ownership rights of the controlling shareholders, VC will tend to a- lign the interests of managers and shareholders through stock incentives. This paper sheds light on the uncovered mechanism of VC supervision on its invested firms, and its change under different ownership structures.