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2016年度诺贝尔经济科学奖获得者Oliver Hart与Bengt Holmstrm研究工作评述 被引量:7

Comments on the Work of Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmstrm——Nobel Prize Winners in Economic Sciences in 2016
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摘要 经济学家Oliver Hart和Bengt Holmstrm因其对契约理论做出的贡献,被授予2016年度诺贝尔经济科学奖。Oliver Hart的贡献主要在不完全契约理论,Bengt Holmstrm的贡献则主要在完全契约理论。契约理论有助于解决由信息不对称引发的经济效益降低的问题,保障社会分工基础上的合作能够有序推进。本文就二位教授在契约理论领域所取得的主要学术成就进行梳理,简要介绍了契约理论对经济社会发展的贡献。 The Sverige Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2016 was awarded jointly to economists Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmstrm for their contributions to contract theory. We review Hart 's contributions to incomplete contracts and Holmstrm's contributions to complete contracts. Building up the optimal incentive contracts and choosing the suitable allocation of property rights can help safeguard the social division of labor cooperation and thus promote the development of economy. This paper summarizes the academic contributions of Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmstrm in contract theory,and introduces the contributions of contract theory for the development of our society.
作者 闫妍 刘宜
出处 《管理评论》 CSSCI 北大核心 2016年第10期3-10,共8页 Management Review
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(71573243) 中科院青年创新促进会基金(2015359) 中国科学院大数据挖掘与知识管理重点实验室开放课题
关键词 诺贝尔经济科学奖 契约理论 完全契约理论 不完全契约理论 the Sverige Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel contract theory complete contract theory incomplete contract theory
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  • 1杨瑞龙,聂辉华.不完全契约理论:一个综述[J].经济研究,2006,41(2):104-115. 被引量:305
  • 2Hart, O. and J. Moore. Incomplete Contracts and Ownership: Some New Thoughts[J]. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceeds, 2007,97(2).
  • 3Hart, Oliver. Reference Points and the Theory of the Firm[J]. Economica, 2008,75 (299).
  • 4Hart, O. and J. Moore. Contracts as reference points[J]. Quarterly Journal of Econom- ics, 2008,123(1).
  • 5Fehr, Ernst,Oliver D. Hart, Christian Zehnder. Contracts as Reference Points.. Experi- mental Evidence [J]. American Economic Review, 2009a, Forthcoming.
  • 6Fehr, Ernst, Oliver D. Hart, Christian Zehnder. Contracts, Reference Points, and Competition--Behavioral Consequences of the Fundamental Transformation[J]. Journal of the European Economic Association, 2009b, 7 (2--3).
  • 7Hart, Oliver. Hold-up, Asset Ownership and Reference Points[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2009,124(1).
  • 8Hart, O. and B. Holmstrom. A Theory of Firm Scope[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2010, Forthcoming.
  • 9Anderlini, L. , L. Felli. Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Contracts[J].Research in Economics, 2004, (58).
  • 10Tirole, Jean. Cognition and Incomplete Contracts [J].American Economic Review, 2009,99(1).

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