公平关切下零售商主导的供应链决策及协调模型

Decision and Coordination Model of Supply Chain with Dominant Retailer Considering Fairness Concern

研究公平关切下由一个制造商和一个主导零售商构成供应链的决策及协调问题,当零售商公平关切时,分析了制造商和主导零售商的最优决策以及供应链系统的协调策略。研究表明在零售商主导的供应链系统中,无论零售商是否公平关切,批发价格契约均不能协调供应链系统。零售商的最优零售价格以及最大效用值,在一定条件下,与其公平关切系数无关。零售商公平关切下,收益共享契约和数量折扣契约均可以协调供应链系统,且协调条件均仅与零售商的渠道能力有关,而与其公平关切系数无关。

To research the decision and coordination problems of supply chain composed of one manufacturer anda dominant retailer under fairness concern, the optimal decisions of supply chain members and coordination strat-egies of supply chain systems were analyzed when the dominant retailer fairness concern. It shows that whetherthe dominant retailer fairness concern or not, wholesale price contract cannot coordinate the supply chain sys-tems. The optimal retail price and maximum utility value of dominant retailer are independent with its fairnessconcern coefficient under certainty conditions. The revenue sharing contract and quantity discount contract bothcould coordinate the supply chain systems, and the coordination conditions are only related to the channel powerbut independent with the fairness concern coefficient of dominant retailer.