孤儿药研发的动态博弈与最优策略研究

Dynamic Game and Optimal Strategies of Orphan Drug R&D

近年来孤儿药短缺问题愈加凸显。解决孤儿药短缺问题的关键在于提高制药企业的积极性,而企业积极性的提高又有赖于政府的政策激励。但是,目前我国仍然缺乏成型且有效的政策激励手段。本研究基于药物经济学、投资评估理论并参考美国的《孤儿药法案》,分析了政府和企业之间复杂的动态博弈关系,建立了三阶段动态博弈模型。模型分析结果显示,政府补贴在企业和患者之间的分配与企业收益之间呈现正U型关系。此外,要扼制企业策略性获取补贴的动机,必须使弱型企业不投机时的期望收益不小于其投机时的期望收益。而政府可以通过调整资金在不同类型企业之间的分配比例α以及在博弈不同阶段的分配比例β,来满足这一关系。

Nowadays, the problem of orphan drug shortage is becoming more and more serious. The key to tackle this problem is to enhance the enthusiasm of pharmaceutical enterprises. In addition, the government policy incentives are also crucial to enterprise initiatives. However, standard and effective methods of government stimuli are lacked in China. Based on pharmacoeconomics, investment appraisal and Orphan Drug Act in the US, the complex game relationship between government and enterprises is depicted in this paper. By constructing and analyzing the three-stage dynamic game model, the result demonstrated that there was a U-shape relationship between government allocation of grants and enterprises＇ expected profits. Moreover, in order to deter the enterprises＇ motive to strategically obtain subsidy, their expected earnings should be no less than those on speculation. Government can accomplish this by adjusting the proportion of grants allocation between different kinds of enterprises（α） and different stages（β）.