信息传播环境下企业广告竞争与定价决策

Advertising competition and pricing under information communication

建立了信息传播环境下两阶段的双寡头广告与价格竞争模型,应用博弈方法分析了企业的广告及定价策略,并进一步讨论了信息传播和广告成本对企业决策和利润的影响.研究表明:在均衡状态下,竞争企业总是采用混合定价策略,且企业在两阶段的定价呈下降趋势;信息传播缓解了企业在第1阶段的竞争,但却加剧了第2阶段的竞争;随着信息传播范围的扩大,企业的广告投入有所减少,但均衡利润却呈现出先增大而后减少的趋势;广告费用的提高不一定总对企业不利,在一定条件下,广告费用的增加反而能提高企业利润.

This paper develops a two-period model where two finns compete on advertising as well as pricing under the scenario of information communication. Game theory is utilized to analyze the firms＇ decisions and profits, based on which the effects of information communication and advertising cost are explored. Researches show that firstly both firms adopt mixed pricing strategies, the equilibrium price falls down from period one to period two, secondly information communication mitigates competition in the first period whereas intensifies competition in the second, thirdly with the increase of information communication intensity, finns spend less on advertising but do not necessarily earn more profits, fourthly advertising cost is not always a bad thing. Under certain conditions, competing firms may be better off with the increase of the advertising cost.