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The Changing of Common Priors in Sequential Auctions

The Changing of Common Priors in Sequential Auctions
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摘要 In sequential auctions the phenomenon of declining prices is often observed, which in theory can be represented by a supermartingale. This paper employs the perspective that bidders' values may change over stages and the common priors are sequentially adjusted by the remaining bidders. It is shown that the declining price sequence can be explained by the adjustment of common priors between auctions. The adjustment of common priors is characterized by stochastic orders. Sufficient and necessary conditions for a supermartingale price sequence are derived. In sequential auctions the phenomenon of declining prices is often observed, which in theory can be represented by a supermartingale. This paper employs the perspective that bidders' values may change over stages and the common priors are sequentially adjusted by the remaining bidders. It is shown that the declining price sequence can be explained by the adjustment of common priors between auctions. The adjustment of common priors is characterized by stochastic orders. Sufficient and necessary conditions for a supermartingale price sequence are derived.
作者 QIAO Heng MA Jun
出处 《Journal of Systems Science & Complexity》 SCIE EI CSCD 2016年第5期1342-1357,共16页 系统科学与复杂性学报(英文版)
基金 supported by Beijing Higher Education Young Elite Teacher Project(YETP0964) the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos.71171053 and 71473282 211 Projects Foundation Projects from School of Economics at Central University of Finance and Economics
关键词 第一价格的封口出价拍卖 私人值的范例 顺序的拍卖 First-price sealed-bid auction, private-value paradigm, sequential auctions.
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