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低碳项目开发商群体演化博弈与政府激励 被引量:2

Evolutionary game of developers and government incentives on low carbon projects
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摘要 针对目前工程项目能耗较高问题,分析政府、开发商等有关低碳工程项目建设的各相关利益主体,基于演化博弈的理论和方法,选取开发商低碳收益、开发成本等指标,进行政府对开发商低碳工程项目建设的演化博弈分析,指出扩大我国低碳项目建设的政府激励方向并给出相关政策建议,为扩大低碳工程项目建设市场的政策制定提供借鉴。 The problem of higher energy consumption is aimed at in current engineering projects. The stakeholders of lowcarbon project construction are analyzed,such as governments and developers. Based on the theory and method of evolutionary game,the indicators are selected such as lowcarbon earnings of developers,and development costs,etc. The evolution game analysis are conducted of the government to the developers on the lowcarbon project construction. The orientation of government incentive to expand lowcarbon projects construction in China is proposed,and the relevant policy recommendations are offered,so as to provide reference for policy making of lowcarbon project construction market.
作者 王华 仇欣欣 WANG Hua QIU Xin-xin(School of Management, Shenyang University of Technology, Shenyang 110870, China)
出处 《沈阳工业大学学报(社会科学版)》 2016年第5期439-442,共4页 Journal of Shenyang University of Technology(Social Sciences)
基金 辽宁省社会科学规划基金项目(L14AJY007)
关键词 低碳项目 开发商 演化博弈 政府激励 lowcarbon project developer evolutionary game government incentive
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