现金持有水平、内部控制缺陷与过度投资

Cash Holdings,Internal Control Deficiencies and Overinvestment

本文以2007—2014年上市公司为研究对象,在"现金流-成长机会"框架下,理论分析与实证检验了不同现金持有动机对过度投资的影响及其内部控制的治理作用。研究发现:相对于预防性动机,代理动机下的现金持有更可能导致企业过度投资,这种现象在内部控制缺陷的企业表现得更为明显,但是缺陷修复之后过度投资受到明显的抑制。研究表明,不同的现金持有动机对过度投资具有不同的影响,内部控制的抑制作用也会因此有不同的表现,而且股权结构分离度与内部控制具有重要的互补效应。本研究通过区分检验两类现金持有动机对过度投资的影响,为过度投资行为提供了新的证据,也为公司投资效率的提高、公司治理的完善与内部控制制度的持续改进提供了新的参考。

This paper theoretical analysis and empirical test different cash holdings motivation effect on over investment and internal control governance role under the framework ＂cash flow - the growth opportunity＂ in China＇s listed companies during 2007 - 2014. It is found that relative to the precautionary motive, agent motivation of cash holdings is more likely to lead to excessive investment, this phenomenon more obvious in the internal control defects of the enterprise performance, but over in- vestment significantly inhibited after defects repaired. Further addition of separation degree, we found that relative to the pre- cautionary motive, the reduction of separation degree can weaken the negative effect of cash holdings by agent motivation on over investment. This study provides new evidence by distinguishing test two kind of cash holdings motivation effect on over in- vestment and over investment behavior, also provides a new reference to improve the etilciency of corporate investment, corpo- rate governance and internal control system.