财政支出结构偏向刺激了中国地方政府罚没收入增长吗?

Does the Distortion of the Chinese Local Governments' Fiscal Expenditure Structure Stimulate the Increase of Revenue from the Fine and Forfeiture?

文章研究了中国各级地方政府的罚没收入与政府财政支出结构之间的关系,发现中国各级地方政府的罚没问题貌似一个行政执法问题,但就其本质而言,是一个政府财政收支结构问题。在"为增长而竞争"的环境下,各级地方政府形成了"重生产性支出、轻非生产性支出"的财政支出模式,罚没收入就成为各级地方政府补偿"非生产性"支出、甚至税收收入的重要工具。这导致了中国社会各项罚款与收费的屡禁不止且不断增长。因此,中国各级地方政府罚没收入屡禁不止的直接原因在于各级地方政府财政支出的扭曲,而根本原因在于地方政府职能的"错位"和"越位"。

This article does some research on the relationship between the Chinese local governments' fiscal expenditure structure and the revenue from fine and forfeiture. It find that the Chinese local governments' fine and forfeiture revenue go up so quickly year by year is not just a problem about the law enforcement. In fact, it is a problem on the fiscal expenditure structure and revenue. Under the circumstance of competition for growth the Chinese local governments taking the economic development as the only objective distort the local governments' fiscal expenditure structure and cut down the non-productive expenditure proportion below the optimal level and permit the local law enforcement to use the fine and forfeiture revenue to complete the insufficient of the non-productive expenditure. It makes the fine and forfeiture revenue going up so quickly. So the root reason is due to the distortion of the local governments' fiscal expenditure structure.