EPR制度下串谋行为管制的三方演化博弈分析

The Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of Collusive behavior Regulatory in EPR System

生产企业在实施延伸生产者责任制(EPR)中,有可能与审查人伙同串谋,产生"搭便车"问题,导致国家利益受损。通过构建生产企业、审查人和政府主管部门的三方演化博弈模型,分析影响三方博弈均衡的重要因素,探讨生产企业与审查人串谋行为的产生条件,提出有针对性的解决对策。

Collusive behavioroccurs between producers and auditors during the implementation of Extended Producer Responsibility （ EPR ） system, results in ＂free-rider＂ evolutionary game model involving producers, auditorsand problem and loss of national benefits.Through building, tripartite government authorities, tripartite gamebalance influence factors prevent collusive behavior between producers and auditors are discussed.