多任务委托代理模型下发电企业经理激励研究

Manager Incentive Mechanism of Power-Generation Company based on Nonlinear Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model

发电企业经理承担着降低发电成本和减排成本两个任务,经理在这两项任务上的努力结果关系着企业效用的实现和自身的报酬。发电企业作为委托人,企业经理作为代理人,建立了多目标、非线性的委托—代理模型,设计了发电企业为激励经理努力工作的合约,并通过求导计算及MATLAB7.1软件作图,分析了影响经理分享企业产出比例的因素,得出委托人的效用与代理人两项任务的完成情况并不是严格上的一致,以及努力成本系数对激励水平的影响的结论。

The manager of the power-generation company has two tasks to finish which are the reductions of the generation costs and the emission reduction costs. The results of the manager＇s efforts are critical to the profit of the enterprise and the manager＇s salary. In view of the two tasks, the paper considers the power generation enterprise as the principal and the manager as the agent, a nonlinear multi-task principal-agent model is set up, incentive contract to encourage the manager to work hard is designed. Then through the derivation calculation and plotting by MATLAB 7.1, the paper analyzes the factors that affecting the output ratio sharing and the by the manager, it is concluded that the utility of the principal is not strictly consistent with the completion of two tasks, effort cost coefficient has important influence on the optimal incentive coefficient.