逻辑原子不同于感觉材料——罗素逻辑原子主义中两种世界结构模型的关系失据论证

Logical atoms dissimilar to sense data: No-evidence-argument in the relation of two kinds of world structure models in Russell's logical atomism

大多数哲学词典将罗素、前期维特根斯坦,甚至卡尔纳普列为逻辑原子主义的代表人物。尽管学界对此争议颇大,但反过来看,这一界定也许表明逻辑原子主义自身就包含了前期维氏和卡尔纳普两种思想的可能性。事实上,作为这一学说典型的代表人物及这一名称的提出者——罗素,他的逻辑原子主义本身就包含了两种世界结构模型,这正是后来前期维氏和卡尔纳普分别加以极端化的结构雏形。这两种世界结构模型的连接点在于逻辑原子和感觉材料的等同论证上,罗素本人对此的论证过于简单隐晦。本文借助当今美国哲学家W.Lycan的文章以还原罗素的论证,并得出罗素的论证是不成功的这一结论。

When defining logical atomism, most philosophy dictionaries acknowledge Russell, early Wittgenstein and even Carnap as its representatives. Although there is a great disagreement on this definition in the academy, in retrospect, it may indicate that logical atomism probably includes the thought of early Wittgenstein and Carnap. In fact, Russell is the typical representative of this doctrine and the very person who names it, and his logical atomism indeed contains two kinds of world structure models, which are the initial models that early Wittgenstein and Carnap respectively develop into the extremes later. The joint between the two kinds of world structure models lies in the equation certification between logical atoms and sense data, about which Russell＇s argument is too simple and covert. So, the present essay will make use of W.Lycan＇s argument to clarify Russell＇s, and draw the conclusion that Russell＇s argument is not successful.