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基于Logit回归模型的CEO声誉与CEO变更关系研究 被引量:3

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摘要 根据预期不一致理论,期望是客户未来评价产品满意度的一个标准。CEO声誉越高,董事会和股东对CEO赋予的期望越高,但这种预期绩效和实际绩效之间往往产生较大差异,从而影响CEO对工作的保留。应用二元Logit回归模型,选取2010—2014年深市上市公司的数据进行检验,结果验证了企业绩效和CEO变更之间的负相关关系,CEO声誉显著调节了这种关系。绩效变差的情况下,高声誉的CEO相比低声誉的CEO更容易发生变更。因此,声誉并不是CEO能保留工作的重要影响因素,CEO只有为企业创造更大的价值,才能保留他们的工作岗位。
作者 张娟 邢文祥
出处 《统计与决策》 CSSCI 北大核心 2016年第21期182-185,共4页 Statistics & Decision
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