信息不对称下企业低碳发展的激励契约设计

Incentive Contract Design for Enterprise's Low-Carbon Development Under Asymmetric Information

企业低碳减排中的低碳技术和减排努力程度属于私有信息时,政府需要甄别其碳减排的真实能力并对其减排努力实施有效的激励。针对上述问题,运用博弈论和激励机制理论,建立了逆向选择与道德风险并存且企业低碳技术为连续类型下的企业低碳发展的激励契约;对比分析了只存在道德风险单一信息不对称的情况,并通过数值仿真进行了验证。结果表明:双重信息不对称时,政府的期望收益减少,企业的减排努力程度降低而收益增加;政府应针对不同技术类型的企业设计差异化的契约激励模式,不但可以起到自我选择的甄别作用,还能诱导企业提高低碳努力程度。

Regarding the situation that low-carbon technology and effort level are both enterprise＇s private information, the government needs to identify the true capability of those enterprises and provide effective incentives to make them work hard on low-carbon emis- sion. To solve it, an incentive model considering both moral hazard and adverse selection is constructed by incorporating game theory and incentive mechanism theory under the condition that enterprise＇s low-carbon technology is continuous. Then the model is solved and compared to the single information asymmetric only with moral hazard, which is verified by numeral simulation. The results show that in dual situation, the expected revenue of government decreases, enterprise＇s effort level reduces but revenue increases. Government should design different contract menus for the enterprises who possess different low-carbon technology to choose. The menus not only has the function of self-selection screening, but also can induce the enterprises to improve their effort level.