延付高管薪酬对银行风险承担的政策效应——基于银行盈余管理动机视角的PSM-DID分析

The Policy Effect of CEO Deferred Compensation on Bank Risk Taking——A PSM-DID Analysis Based on Bank Earnings Management

2008年国际金融危机后,延付银行高管薪酬已成为中国监管部门降低金融风险的重要举措。理论上,这一政策实施很可能降低银行的收益波动性,进而降低其通过LLP进行盈余管理的动机。本文利用2010年银监会发布《商业银行稳健薪酬监管指引》这一政策冲击和中国银行业2009—2013年的数据,通过"准自然实验"的PSM-DID分析却发现,延付高管薪酬在降低银行收益波动性的同时反而增强了其通过LLP进行盈余管理的动机。进一步对其动态边际效应进行检验后发现,银行通过LLP进行盈余管理的动机在薪酬延付后的第3年尤为显著。出现这种情况的主要原因在于,当前中国银行业高管延付薪酬的考核期限仅为3年,出于稳健性薪酬的目的,高管在延付薪酬后的第3年(考核期满时)有更强的动力和能力进行盈余管理,从而可能令延付高管薪酬政策对银行风险承担的约束作用大打折扣。因此,进一步优化高管薪酬的延付时间、改革高管薪酬考核的绩效指标、引入激励性的养老金制度,是改革和完善当前银行高管薪酬延付制度、实现银行稳健经营和持续发展的重要举措。

Deferred bank executive compensation has become an important measure of Chinese regulators＇ reducing financial risk after the 2008 international financial crisis. Theoretically, this policy will reduce banks＇ earnings volatility and their incentive of earnings management via LLP （loan loss provision） furtherly. However, taking the ＂Commercial Banks Robust Compensation Regulatory Guidelines＂ issued by CBRC in 2010 as an experiment shock and using the propensity score matching-difference in difference （PSM-DID） approach, this paper found that CEO deferred compensation reduce banks＇ earnings volatility but simultaneously strengthen their earnings management incentive. Uheriorly testing the dynamic marginal effect, this paper found that banks＇ earnings management via LLP is especially significant in the 3rd year after CEO compensation deferred paid. This is because that the deferred period of CEO compensation is only 3 years, in order to get more robust compensation, CEO has stronger incentive and ability to manipulate banks＇ earnings. These findings have several policy implications on the reform of banks＇ deferred executive compensation.