农村小微金融“内部化悖论”的案例分析

The Internalization Paradox in Rural Micro-finance:A Case Study

本文在回顾以往研究的基础上,提出农村小微金融的发展困境源于"双重悖论":第一重是"合法化悖论",第二重是"内部化悖论"。前者主要体现为制度效率较高的非正规小微金融在"正规化"之后制度效率下降,对此学术界已经有过充分讨论;后者形成于当前农民合作组织及政府普惠政策的"精英俘获"特征渐趋强化的现实背景下。本文以Z合作社资金互助部为例进行案例分析,认为该合伙制小微金融能够内部化交易成本却因不能内部化外部性风险而只能将风险转化成组织解体的制度风险。最后,本文提出"通过以重构合作制为基础的组织创新和制度创新破解‘双重悖论’"的政策启示。

This article explores two paradoxes that attribute to the development plight of rural micro-finance.On the one hand,informal rural micro-finance institutions are found to suffer from a loss in efficiency after the implementation of formal requirements,which can be called 'legalization paradox' in the previous studies.The other paradox forms when 'elite capture' becomes apparent in the implementation of public supporting policies in farmers' cooperative organizations.This study examines an example of SY Mutual Fund,and finds that while this cooperative micro-finance organization has successfully reduced transaction costs,it failed to internalize external risks which may lead to the dissolution of cooperation.To conclude,the study proposes that two paradoxes can be solved by way of organizational innovation and institutional innovation on the basis of rebuilding the cooperative system.