分析师关注能遏制高管交易获利吗?

Can Analysts Prohibit Top Managers from Profiting?

分析师在资本市场上通过对公司公开信息的解释和私有信息的挖掘,能够起到约束高管行为的作用,然而分析师与高管存在合谋套利的可能性,其独立性备受质疑。本文利用窗口事件法,检验高管交易获利这一特定情境下分析师的作用。研究发现,分析师关注能够有效遏制高管交易行为的择时能力和实际获利能力,显著降低高管短期(长期)交易行为的超额收益,其约束效应在短期(长期)主要通过遏制亲属(高管本人)交易获利实现。研究结果表明分析师关注能够促进企业内外部信息流动,约束高管投机性行为,保护中小投资者的权益。

Analysts play an important role of public information explanation and private information mining in the capital market. However, the possibility of collusion between the analysts and the company executives makes their dependence in doubt. This paper uses the window event method to study whether analysts focus can make a constraining effect on executives＇ trading behavior. The results show that the analysts＇ focus effectively restrains the timing ability and the actual profitability of executives＇ trading and significantly reduce the excess returns of the short-term trading and long-term trading of the execu- tives. Group research shows that the constraint effect of analysts focus in the short-term is mainly achieved through the contain- ment of relatives to achieve profitable trading, whereas in the long-term is mainly achieved through the containment of execu- tives themselves to profit. Therefore, the analysts can promote the internal and external information flow in the companies, which can reduce the speculative behavior of executives, reduce information asymmetry and protect the rights and interests of small investors.