治理环境、代理问题与现金持有行为研究——基于中国上市公司的经验证据

Study on Corporate Governance,Agency Problem and Behavior of Corporate Cash Holdings—Based on Empirical Study of China Stock Market

本文研究了我国上市公司治理环境、代理问题与现金持有行为的关系,考察了治理环境如何通过内部治理机制影响上市公司现金持有行为。利用我国深沪两市2001—2013年间的上市公司数据及樊纲、王小鲁和朱恒鹏公布的中国市场化指数,研究发现:治理环境显著地影响了企业的现金持有行为,它和现金持有行为之间存在显著正相关关系;我们还发现,不同治理环境下的管理者和大股东现金持有行为存在显著差异——治理环境好的企业,管理者和大股东持有现金水平较高,而治理环境差的企业,管理者和大股东持有现金水平较低。进一步验证了Jensen(1986)"自由现金流理论",表明在现金持有行为上,"现金花费说"比"财务弹性说"能更好地解释中国上市公司的现金持有行为。这一研究结果为我国政府及相关监管部门构建良好的外部治理环境,完善公司内部治理机制,加强上市公司监管提供了有益的思路。

Study on the relationship between environmental governance,agency problem and cash holdings of China listed Corporation,and how the internal governance mechanisms affect cash holding behavior of listing Corporation. This paper uses data of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market during 2001—2015and Chinese market index of Fang Gang,Wang Xiao lu and Zhu Heng peng published. The study found：Governance environment had significant effect on the behavior of corporate cash holdings,a significant positive correlation between it and cash holdings We also found,There are significant differences between different governance environment management and major shareholders in cash holding behavior,Good governance environment of the enterprise,managers and large shareholders holding cash level is higher,and the governance environment of the enterprise,managers and large shareholders holding low levels of cash,proved Jensen（ 1986） ＂the free cash flow theory＂. This shows that in cash holding behavior,＂said cash costs＂than ＂financial flexibility＂can better explain the Chinese listing Corporation＇s cash holding behavior,Building a good external governance environment for China＇s government and the relevant regulatory authorities,improve the internal governance mechanism,provide good suggestions to strengthen the supervision of listing Corporation.