省际财政竞争、政府治理能力与企业迁移

Local Fiscal Competition,Governance Capability and Enterprise Migration

本文在两级政府框架下,构建一个反映地方政府财政竞争与企业利润关系的理论模型。纳什均衡显示,企业迁移时更青睐高公共投资的高治理能力地区和高税收优惠的低治理能力地区。经验分析证实,在中国高治理能力地区,支出竞争呈现显著正效应,税收竞争呈现显著负效应;在低治理能力地区恰好相反。"一刀切"清理地方税收优惠,对高治理能力地区的"底线税收竞争"有矫正作用;无差别税率并非最有效率,它会削弱低治理能力地区对企业的吸引力,并使拥有较多公共产品存量的高治理能力地区受益;它还会加剧"公共投资竞赛",放大支出竞争的正、负效应。

Under the framework of two-level governments, this paper builds a theoretical model that accounts for the relationship between local fiscal competition and business profits. The Nash equilibrium analysis presents that the private investment prefers regions with high governance capacity and high public investment, or regions with low governance capacity and low effective tax rate. On the other hand, the optimal fiscal competition strategy of a local government depends on its own governmental efficiency. The empirical results prove that the expenditure competition has a significant positive effect on private investment, both at a nationwide level and in the regions with high governance capacity. For the regions with low governance capacity, the competition has a significant negative effect. However, the tax competition is exactly the opposite. Removing all local tax benefits may correct the ＂race to the bottom＂ tax competition in the regions with high governance capacity, but meanwhile it may reduce the attractiveness of the regions with low governance capacity. The more stock of public goods the region has, the more affected it is by such removal. If local tax incentives are prohibited, then the expenditure competition must be fiercer. Therefore, its effects will be amplified, possibly leading to a Matthew effect in capital allocation.