我们为什么对自己的行为负有道德责任?——相容论的解释及其问题

Why Should We Bear Moral Responsibility for Our Own Behavior?— A Compatibilist Explanation and the Problems with It

人们通常认为,只有人是自由的,他们对自己的行为才负有道德责任。但是,从科学的观点看,人不是自由的,因为人的行为服从于因果解释,而这种解释的性质是决定论的。这样便产生一个重大的道德理论问题:自由(以及道德责任)与决定论是不是相容的?一些道德哲学家主张两者是不相容的,而很多道德哲学家则主张"相容论"。相容论者面对的一个根本难题是:如果决定论是真的,那么人如何能够对自己的行为负有道德责任?大体上我们可以归纳出三种版本的回答,即反应理论、等级理论和价值理论。我们的分析和批评表明,这些版本的相容论都存在一些难以克服的困难。

It is usually believed that only with freedom do humans bear moral responsibility for their own behavior. However, from a scientific perspective, humans are not free because human behavior submits to a cause-and-effectexplanation, which is by nature determinist, thus generating a significant question on moral theory： Is freedom （as well as moral responsibility） compatible with determinism？ Some moral philosophers maintain that they are incompatible whereas many argue for compatibilism. Thus, compatibilists are confronted with a question fundamentally hard to answer： If determinism is true, how can humans have moral responsibility for their own behavior？ Generally speaking, we can sum up three versions of answers, namely response theory, hierarchy theory, and value theory. The present critical analysis suggests that there exist in- surmountable difficulties in compatibilism in these versions.